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dramatic technical change in the law, the application will not cause
any unsettling effects in practice, as the defense had seldom been
successfully invoked in Louisiana. However, if later jurisprudence
adheres to Justice Dixon's misstatements of the Loescher rule as
the present state of the law, great practical changes will have occurred as a result of Arceneaux: the traditional plaintiff's burden of
proof will have been shifted to the defendant in automobile rear-end
collision cases, and the concept of defect will have ceased to be a
vital element of a plaintiff's case under Civil Code article 2317.
W. H. Parker,III

NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION: CAN AN ATTORNEY RELY ON
WHAT THE GOVERNMENT TELLS HIM?

The attorney representing a school lunchroom worker injured
by an allegedly defective steam cooker wrote the school board and
requested the name of the manufacturer of the equipment. The
school board furnished him an incorrect name, information which he
used in filing suit. After the one-year prescriptive period had run,
the attorney discovered the mistake and amended the plaintiff's
petition to sue the school board for its negligence in advising him.
The trial court sustained an exception of no cause of action, and the
court of appeal affirmed.' In affirming the lower court's decision, the
Louisiana Supreme Court found that the plaintiff had failed to allege
facts which would justify the imposition upon the school board of a
duty to exercise care in supplying the information.! Devore v.
Hobart Manufacturing Co., 367 So. 2d 836 (La. 1979).
Courts in common law jurisdictions have established a general
framework of facts necessary for a finding of negligent misrepresen1. 359 So. 2d 1108 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
2. The majority cited as reasons for its holding the insufficiency of the defendant's knowledge of the extent to which the plaintiff and her attorney planned to rely
on the information and the fact that neither was prevented from personally inspecting
the equipment. The opinion implicitly adopted the conclusions of the appellate court,
which relied heavily upon section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, defining
the common law cause of action for negligent misrepresentation. The part of the
Restatement test not met was the requirement that the defendant have a pecuniary interest in the transfer of the information. The majority's implicit approval of the intermediate court's holding and the dissent's protest of the use of the pecuniary interest test requirement indicate that this segment of the Restatement test was a major bar to the finding of a cause of action.
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tation that causes economic harm. The relationship between the supplier and the recipient of the information must be one that gives
rise to a duty on the part of the supplier to use due care in obtaining and transmitting the information. The supplier must have actual
or constructive knowledge that the information is desired for a
serious purpose and will be relied upon by the recipient. Finally, the
harm suffered by the recipient must be attributed to his reliance on
the false information.' The first major American case to recognize
negligent misrepresentation and state the elements of the modern
cause of action was International Products Co. v. Erie Rail Co.,'
which established the basic requirements that the supplier have
notice of the importance attached to his representations and that
the recipient have a right to rely on the other's statements.
Negligent misrepresentation evolved from the action of deceit
and has a complex history. For many years there was no "negligent"
misrepresentation; plaintiffs were denied recovery if they did not
prove fraud, a requirement established in Derry v. Peek,' which was
decided by the House of Lords in 1889. The directors of a tramway
company issued a prospectus stating the company had the right to
use steam power. The Board of Trade refused to consent to the use
of the new steam power method, and the company was dissolved. Investors sued the directors for deceit. The Court of Appeal in
Chancery held the directors liable, announcing a rule, similar to the
modern rule, that a person has a duty not to make "a statement to
be acted upon by others which is false, and which is known by him
to be false, or is made by him recklessly, or without care whether it
is true or false-that is, without any reasonable ground for believing it to be true."' The House of Lords, however, reversed resoundingly, holding that fraud was necessary for a finding of liability.7
This view prevailed in England until the 1963 decision of Hedley
Byrne & Co. v. Heller & PartnersLtd.,' in which the House of Lords
3.

Comment, Negligent Misrepresentation:Fraud or Negligence, 13 CLEV.-MAR.

L. REV. 250, 259-60 (1976).
4. 244 N.Y. 331, 155 N.E. 662 (1927).
5. 14 App. Cas. 337 (H.L. 1889).
6. 37 Ch. D. 541, 566 (Ch. App. 1887).
7. 14 App. Cas. at 343.
8. [1964] A.C. 465 (H.L.). The justices of the Court of Appeal had followed the
Derry precedent in Le Lievre v. Gould, [1893] 1 Q.B. 491 (C.A.), holding a surveyor
who negligently certified certain stages of completion of a building was not liable to a
mortgagee who, relying on the information, advanced money to the builder and incurred financial loss when the builder failed to complete construction. The court held the
surveyor was not liable in the absence of proof of fraud. The House of Lords indicated
it would deviate from the Derry rule in Nocton v. Ashburton, [1914] A.C. 932 (H.L.),

finding liability where the negligent supplier of information owed a fiduciary duty to
the plaintiff. In that case, a solicitor misadvised his client. The Lords distinguished
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found a duty on the part of a bank to take care in giving financial information regarding its customers. Lord Reid, disposing of the
troublesome precedent of Derry, discounted its influence on intervening decisions: "It must now be taken that Derry v. Peek did
not establish any universal rule that in the absence of contract an
innocent but negligent misrepresentation cannot give rise to an action." 9
The scienter requirement carried over to American cases, and
well into the twentieth century courts refused to find liability for
mere negligent misrepresentation. In the 1902 case of Warfield v.
0
Clark,"
an Iowa court stated: "This action is founded on active and
conscious misrepresentation as to the condition of the company, and
can only be sustained by proof of intentional fraud. It cannot be
predicated on negligence, however gross."" This position was
solidified in (then) Judge Cardozo's opinion in Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche," a case against public accountants who negligently
prepared and certified a balance sheet to be used by a client in procuring credit. Judge Cardozo said the accountants owed a duty to
prospective lenders, who were not in privity of contract, to prepare
the report without fraud, but could not be held responsible for
negligent preparation. Although the courts eventually abandoned
this scienter requirement, scholars debated the necessity for fraudulent intent as late as the 1930's."8
In keeping with the restrictive intent requirement, early twentieth century courts also required the injured party to show privity
of contract with the representing party. In this area, too, the rule of
Ultramares was the prevailing view for some time. Judge Cardozo's
concern regarding "liability in an indeterminate amount for an inDerry on the basis that only fraud, and not a fiduciary duty, was considered. The
Court of Appeal again followed Derry in holding accountants for a company owed no
duty of care to prospective investors who requested financial reports. Candler v.
Crane, Christmas & Co., [19511 2 K.B. 164 (C.A.). The one dissenting justice argued
that "those persons such as accountants, surveyors, valuers and analysts, whose profession and occupation it is to examine books, accounts, and other things, and to make
reports on which other people . ..rely in the ordinary course of business" should be
held liable for their negligence. [1951] 2 K.B. at 179 (Denning, L.J., dissenting). It was
not until the Hedley case some twelve years later that the controversy was finally laid
to rest in England.
9. [1964] A.C. at 484.
10. 118 Iowa 69, 91 N.W. 833 (1902).
11. Id. at 75, 91 N.W. at 836.
12. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). But see Dime Sav. Bank v. Fletcher, 158
Mich. 162, 122 N.W. 540 (1909); Houston v. Thornton, 122 N.C. 272, 29 S.E. 827 (1898).
13. See, e.g., Bohlen, Should Negligent Misrepresentations Be Treated as
Negligence or Fraud?, 18 VA. L. REV. 703 (1932); Green, Deceit, 16 VA. L. REV. 749
(1930).
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determinate time to an indeterminate class"'" was echoed in the
judicial opinions and literature. 5 In early cases, liability was rejected for corporate directors who filed false information with state
agencies, to the detriment of investors;16 an attorney who misadvised
a person who was not his client;' 7 and a notary who signed a false
mortgage cancellation used to obtain a second mortgage. 8 Soon,
however, courts began to relax the privity requirement and, perhaps
to Judge Cardozo's chagrin, his opinion in Glanzer v. Shepard,9
rendered before the Ultramares decision, became the leading
authority. In holding a public weigher liable to a produce buyer who
relied on the weigher's figures, Cardozo had rejected the privity
argument, writing, "Constantly the bounds of duty are enlarged by
knowledge of a prospective use.'"" He was forced to distinguish
Glanzer in order to reach the result in Ultramares;he did so on two
bases: the relationship between the weigher and the produce buyer
was closer than that of the accountant and the lender in Ultramares
and the weight report was the "end and aim of the transaction"
whereas the accountants' report in Ultramares was not expressly
prepared for the benefit of the lender who relied upon it in making
his business decision." In recent years, the privity requirement has
been rejected and liability has been founded on other factors which
establish a duty to use care."
Although one commentator recently wrote, "The common law ...
was unwilling to permit liability for a negligent, non-fraudulent
misstatement which caused injury or damage to another, unless he
had 'purchased' the benefit of a duty of care on the part of the other
party,"" a strong vestige of privity, the requirement of a pecuniary
14. 255 N.Y. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
15. See, e.g., Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969); Candler v. Crane,
Christmas & Co., [1951] 2 K.B. 164 (C.A.); Prosser, Misrepresentation and Third Persons, 19 VAND. L. REV. 231 (1966).
16. E.g., Hunnewell v. Duxbury, 154 Mass. 286, 28 N.E. 267 (1891).
17. E.g., Rosenberg v. Cyrowski, 227 Mich. 508, 198 N.W. 905 (1924).
18. E.g., New England Bond & Mortgage Co. v. Brock, 270 Mass. 107, 169 N.E.

803 (1930).
19. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
20. Id. at 240, 135 N.E. at 276.
21. Id. at 238-39, 135 N.E. at 275.
22. Texas Tunneling Co. v. City of Chattanooga, 204 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. Tenn.
1962); Rozny v. Marnul, 43 Ill. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969); Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d
395 (Iowa 1969). The Hedley case had a decided influence on the fate of the privity requirement and was much noted in America. See Goodhart, Liability for Innocent But
Negligent Misrepresentations,74 YALE L.J. 286 (1964); Green, The Duty to Give Accurate Information, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 464 (1965); Prosser, supra note 15, at 231.
23.

added).

Fridman, Negligent Misrepresentation 22 McGILL L.J. 1, 2 (1976) (emphasis
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interest in the transaction, still exists. Dean Prosser noted,
"[S]eparate recognition [of the negligent misrepresentation tort] has
been confined in practice very largely to the invasion of interests of
a financial or commercial character, in the course of business dealings."2' As another writer commented, "It is therefore difficult to
think of any misrepresentation which gives rise to financial injury
which will not be concerned with a business or professional transaction."25 Some scholars advocate a further relaxing of the interest requirement to some special relationship or a standard of foreseeability."6 However, the more conservative
position has been adopted
27
in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
24. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 684 (4th ed. 1971).
25. Goodhart, supra note 22, at 299-300.
26. Professor Fridman, writing in the McGill Law Journal .advocates the
foreseeability standard:
I find it hard to accept, therefore, that basing liability upon the test of
foreseeability would inevitably result in an overlarge extension of the liability
that unquestionably exists or can arise at the present time. . . .Only the difference between physical harm and economic loss, and the possibility of larger,
more extensive, more costly liability, might justify a differentiation in the bases
of liability. In the days when awards of damages for physical injuries suffered
through negligence are mounting, it seems difficult to see any possible justification for a distinction between two varieties of negligence liability based upon the
fear of exaggerated awards, or too extensive a liability.
Fridman, Negligent Misrepresentation"A Postscript, 22 McGILL L.J. 649, 655 (1976).
Another writer advocated the special relationship requirement:
The modern trend, however, is to expand the ambit of responsibility to include
those persons whose reliance on the misrepresentations could reasonably be foreseen. Thus the requirement of privity has been eliminated where reliance by
plaintiff was contemplated and where the one making the negligent misrepresentation was in a situation of special trust, such as a certified public accountant, title abstractor, or notary.
Recent Decisions-Torts, 48 VA. L. REV. 1476, 1478 (1962). Professor Goodhart rejects
the latter view and argues that debates on the scope of duty
could be avoided if the concept of "special relationship," with all its ambiguities,
were deleted from the law and in its place were substituted ... a general duty to
exercise reasonable care not to injure others by false statements, just as there is
a duty not to injure them by harmful acts.
Goodhart, supra note 22, at 300. Leon Green appears to agree. Green, supra note 22.

27.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 552 (1976) provides:

(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any
other transactions in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information
for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for
pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if
he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating
the information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection (1) is
limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and
guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient intends
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The unusual facts of the instant case, particularly the involvement of the attorney, complicated what would otherwise have been
a typical negligent misrepresentation case easily resolved by application of the common law doctrine. The attorney's letter to the
school board was referred to the director of school food service, who
replied that the manufacturer of the steam cooker was Cleveland
Manufacturing Company. The attorney discovered that the company
was not listed with the Secretary of State as a foreign corporation,
but found a company with a name similar to that, Cleveland Consolidated, Inc. Within the prescriptive period, suit was filed against
both companies and Hobart Manufacturing Company, a name given
the attorney by the plaintiff. The attorney subsequently discovered
that the true manufacturer was Cleveland Range Company (also not
listed with the Secretary of State) and added the company as a
defendant by supplemental petition filed after the one-year anniversary date of the accident. The petition also named the school board
and the director of school food services as alternative defendants,
claiming they were negligent in conveying the name of the manufacturer. The trial court sustained the exception of prescription filed
by Cleveland Range Company and the exception of no cause of action filed by the school board. Only the latter decision was appealed,
and the third circuit affirmed the decision of the lower court.28
The supreme court majority opinion acknowledged that the Civil
Code encompasses a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation,29 but relied largely on the Restatement in declining to find a
cause of action in the instant case. The threshold question for determining the existence of a duty under the Restatement test, whether
the school board had a pecuniary interest in giving the name of the
manufacturer, appeared to have been answered summarily. The
court directed most of its discussion to the factual issues of whether
the defendant knew of the plaintiff's reliance and had exclusive control of the information. Finding the plaintiff's allegations insufficient, the court determined the requirements of the Restatement
test had not been met and the plaintiff had no cause of action.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Tate rejected the application of
to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the information
to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar
transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the information extends
to loss suffered by any of the class of persons for whose benefit the duty is
created, in any of the transactions in which it is intended to protect them.
28. 359 So. 2d 1108 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
29. 367 So. 2d at 839, citing LA. CiV. CODE arts. 2315-16.
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the pecuniary interest test and would have found the existence of a
duty based on the defendant's knowledge of the importance of the
information to the plaintiff, the school board's exclusive control of
the information, and the employer-employee relationship between
the plaintiff and the defendant. He left unclear the standards by
which the court would determine the liability of public agencies in
future actions based on negligent misrepresentation in which this
apparently essential employment relationship is not present. In
order "to differentiate an actionable circumstance from one in which
a purely gratuitous service is performed as a favor,"3 Justice Tate
would impose a substitute test to fulfill the purpose of the pecuniary
interest requirement. However, broad language in his dissent indicates the test will be anything but onerous for the plaintiff to
meet; the plaintiff need only show that the defendant supplied the
information "in the course of the performance of its public
function."'
The dissent introduced as a consideration, which also may have
influenced the majority's opinion, the role of the attorney.2 Upon
closer reading, it appears that the majority may have felt that the
attorney was remiss in his reliance on the school board's information
and should bear the responsibility for the latter's error. The court
considered the question of the defendant's duty to the attorney as
well as to the plaintiff.3 Language in the opinion exhibits a belief
that the attorney did not use all the means available to him to
prepare his client's case:
It cannot be presumed that Jones or the School Board knew or
should have known that plaintiff's attorney would rely entirely
upon the information furnished, make no independent investigation, forego discovery, fail to timely file against the proper
defendant, and let prescription run. . . . That risk was and
should have been much more obvious to plaintiff and her attorney than to defendants."
Justice Tate disagreed and found that "[tihe majority's implication
imposes an unreasonable standard of duty upon an attorney ... ."S
He asserted that placing the burden of investigation on attorneys
might waste their limited time and specialized talents and increase
30. 367 So. 2d at 843 (Tate, J., dissenting).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 842 n.1.
33. "There are no facts set forth which would in our view impose upon the
employer-equipment custodian a duty to plaintiff or her attorney to exercise the care
in supplying correct information which ultimately proved lacking." 367 So. 2d at 839.
34. Id.
35. 367 So. 2d at 842 n.1 (Tate, J., dissenting).
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the cost of legal services. In taking exception to the majority's allusions to the attorney's handling of the case, he used negligenceoriented language to evaluate the attorney's conduct: "I am simply
unable to percieve any reason why, in the exercise of ordinary
prudence, the attorney should doubt the veracity of such information or be required to investigate its reliability." '
According to the Restatement test, once the defendant's
knowledge of the plaintiff's reliance is established (a fact disputed in
the instant case by the majority and the dissent), the plaintiff must
show a pecuniary interest on the part of the defendant to justify the
imposition of a duty. However, when the defendant is a governmental entity, how is that aspect of the test to be applied? In Devore
the court routinely applied the pecuniary interest requirement of
the Restatement test and did not discuss the identity of the defendant as a factor that might render the requirement inappropriate.
But the Restatement test is designed to justify the imposition of a
duty on private parties and it cannot adequately be extended to
public entities, because such defendants can never satisfy the
pecuniary interest requirement. In contrast, Justice Tate advocated
an approach which replaces the pecuniary interest test with a test
which will find the necessary reciprocity of interest in almost
limitless circumstances. If the requirement is fulfilled merely by finding the performance of a public function, the court will have no
substantial test for determining when a duty should be imposed on a
defendant. The better solution is to substitute for the pecuniary interest test an inquiry which will allow a more individual evaluation
of the mutuality of interest between the supplier and recipient of information.
Canadian courts have dealt with negligent misrepresentation by
government agencies in several cases and tend to hold the defendants liable. A case strikingly similar to Devore involved a zoning
department employee who incorrectly informed a restaurant owner
that his business could be operated in a certain location without
violating zoning laws. The plaintiff consulted a solicitor to draw up
the lease, and the solicitor called the zoning department to verify
the information but made no investigation of his own. The building
permit was revoked upon discovery that the restaurant violated zoning regulations, and the restaurant owner filed suit against the city.
In granting recovery to the plaintiff, the Ontario High Court held
that the city owed a duty to give correct information regarding the
zoning laws since responding to such inquiries was one of the purposes of the zoning department, and its employees knew of the
36. Id,(Emphasis added).
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reliance that would be placed on their statements. 7 There are cases
to the contrary, but those decisions appear to be based upon special
facts, such as the exercise of legislative power, a discretionary
governmental function removed from liability, 8 or a superior
knowledge by the plaintiff of the information supplied. 9 None of the
cases provide a clear test which can be substituted for the pecuniary
interest element;"0 nevertheless, each case involved a service provided
by the government agency to an individual, as opposed to a service
for the benefit of the general populace. Such a difference in the
nature of the act performed may provide the key element in formulating a proper test.
Louisiana courts have distinguished between a duty of care owed
to an individual and a duty of care owed to the public at large in
other tort actions against governmental defendants. In Hester v.
42
appellate courts held that the
Sanderson'1 and Serpas v. Margiotta,
public employee defendant owed a duty to the particular plaintiff
and was liable for his negligence, although it appears these decisions
were influenced by the presence of gross negligence on the part of
the government agents."3 In 1977, the fourth circuit maintained an
exception of no cause of action in a suit against certain agencies
responsible for building inspections, holding the duty to inspect was
owed to the general public and not to plaintiffs injured in a fire
caused by hazardous conditions." A similar result was reached by
the first circuit in Peltier v. Department of Highways,"5 in which the
department was held not liable to farmers who could not transport
their crops to market because of delay in repairing a bridge. It is
noteworthy that both opinions admitted the difficulty in determining
liability of the public agency," which indicates that the individual interest test may be difficult to apply.
37. Gadutsis v. Milne, 34 D.L.R.3d 455 (1972) (Can.).
38. See Welbridge Holdings Ltd. v. The Metropolitan Corp. of Greater Winnipeg,
[19711 1 Can. S. Ct. 957.
39. See The Town of the Pas v. Porky Packers, Ltd., [19771 1 Can. S. Ct. 51.
40. Of these Canadian cases, only the opinion in Welbridge Holdings contained a
discussion of the nature of the governmental defendant as necessitating special consideration. [19711 1 Can. S. Ct. at 968-69.
41. 172 So. 565 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1937). A federal inspector disregarded his
superior's orders to burn tick-infested hay and sprayed it with arsenic instead. The

plaintiffs cows ate the poisned hay and died.
42. 59 So. 2d 492 (La. App. Orl. App. 1952). An employee of the State Society for
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals refused to capture a suspected rabid dog; as a conse-

quence, a child was bitten and died of rabies.
43. Serpas v. Margiotta, 59 So. 2d at 496; Hester v. Sanderson, 172 So. at 567.
44. Dufrene v. Guarino, 343 So. 2d 1097 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
45. 357 So. 2d 897 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
46. 343 So. 2d at 1098. Judge Ponder, writing in Peltier,said, "Admittedly, there
is considerable range of judgment in the determination of the scope of protection from
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Some jurisdictions use a test based on the activity of the
governmental defendant, rather than the duty owed to the plaintiff.
This test, referred to as the governmental/proprietary test,
distinguishes between the state's activities in its peculiarly governmental capacity and its activities which are common to the private
sector.47 The state is immune from liability in governmental functions but is treated as a private defendant when proprietary activities are involved.48 However, this approach has been criticized as
being subjective and for leading to unpredictable decisions.49
The above-outlined tests are designed to insulate government
from liability in areas in which a fear of liability would unduly
restrict the government's ability to deal with problems; the test in a
negligent misrepresentation action would serve to determine when the
government agency and the individual have interests so closely connected as to justify the imposition upon the government of a duty to
use care in conveying information. Although the inquiries are different, the tests used in other tort actions against governmental
defendants could be applied in claims based on negligent
misrepresentation. However, both the duty and function classifications are highly subjective and likely to obscure the underlying
analysis of the competing interests. Nevertheless, the tests are advantageous in that they offer the courts a means of limiting the
government's liability.
A better solution may be the enactment of a tort claims act, 50
theoretically a reasoned legislative judgment reached after full consideration of the competing interests of plaintiffs and public defenloss resulting from a breach of duty in cases such as this. Admittedly, there will be
frequent differences of opinion in the courts and in the legislature." 357 So. 2d at 899.
47. Courts have held the following activities to be governmental in nature: guarding of school zone crossings, Sarmiento v. City of Corpus Christi, 465 S.W.2d 813 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1971); operation of a zoo, Grover v. City of Manhattan, 198 Kar. 307, 424
P.2d 256 (1967); operation of a sewerage system, People v. Mission Brook Sanitary
Dist., 76 Ill. App. 2d 423, 222 N.E.2d 8 (1966).
Activities held to be proprietary in nature include: the installation of a sewerage
line, Hatten v. Mason Realty Co., 148 W. Va. 380, 135 S.E.2d 236 (1964); the operation
of a recreation program, Morris v. Mount Lebanon Township School Dist., 393 Pa. 633,
144 A.2d 737 (1958).
48. F. STONE, TORT DOCTRINE § 106, in 12 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 144
(1977).
49. Fordham & Pegues, Local Government Responsibility in Tort in Louisiana, 3
LA. L. REV. 720 (1941).

50. Such a solution would also be consistent with the preeminence of legislation in
a civilian system. The Louisiana legislature has twice considered bills to enact tort
claims acts for local governments, but neither was passed. La. S.B. 553, 4th Reg. Sess.
(1978); La. H.B. 648, 3d Reg. Sess. (1977).
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dants.5" Some states have enacted tort claims acts, and most exclude
misrepresentation from actionable torts."2 The federal statutes also
exempt misrepresentation from negligent acts for which federal
agencies and employees are liable. 3 While such an act would provide
a consistent standard for determining liability, it would necessarily
be absolute in foreclosing any consideration on a case by case basis.
If a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation is applied to
government agencies in Louisiana, should there not be an exception,
similar to contributory negligence, which holds plaintiffs to a higher
standard of care if they are able to protect themselves?54 The
peculiar fact situation of Devore provides a specific context for posing the question: should a plaintiff relying on a representation be
held to a higher standard of care because he is assisted by a
knowledgeable attorney who can confirm the accuracy of the information? Statements in both the majority and the dissenting opinions
of the court indicate that the role of the attorney was an important
consideration.5 Apparently, the court determined that the attorney
was remiss in his investigation of the facts; it then, in some manner,
"imputed" that failing to the plaintiff, or at least imputed the attorney's superior skill and knowledge of the law to the plaintiff and
reached the conclusion that the plaintiff did not have the right to rely
on the information furnished by the school board.
Assuming that plaintiffs represented by knowledgeable counsel
are held to a higher standard of care, the decision raises a second
51. Because of the wide range of activities in which governments become involved,
their agencies become repositories of vast amounts of information. As such, they would
be exposed to almost unlimited liability if the negligent misrepresentation cause of action were to be applied in all cases where these agencies had a duty to provide this information. A tort claims act might exempt from liability any agency that dispenses information to the public as its primary function.
52. ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250 (1965); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2901 (1969); CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 818.8 (West 1963); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106 (1963); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §
4001 (1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28 (West 1977); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 662-15 (1972);
IDAHO CODE § 6-904 (1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, § 2-106 (Smith-Hurd 1965); IND. CODE
ANN. § 34-4-16.5-3 (Burns 1977); IOWA CODE ANN. § 25A.14 (West 1971); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 46-901 to -902a (1978); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8101 (1972); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 258, § 10 (West 1978); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 691.1407 (1970); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§
466.01 to .15 (West 1963); Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.600 (1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §
2-9-101 to 114 (1977); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 23-2401 to -2420 (1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
59:1-1 to 12-3 (West 1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-1 to -25 (1978); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW
§ 50.502 (McKinney 1936); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 155 (West 1979); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 4.92.010 to .170 (1969).
53. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1974).
54. For a suggestion that the plaintiffs ability to protect himself be a criterion in
determining liability in products liability cases, see Wade, On the Nature of Strict
Tort Liabilityfor Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973).
55. See text at notes 32-36, supra.
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question: what is the extent of the diligence and care required of the
attorney? Unfortunately, the only Louisiana decisions providing any
indication of the extent of the duty of attorneys are largely malpractice cases. A 1973 first circuit decision awarded a plaintiff damages
for the loss of his claim when his attorney failed to check the date of
the accident and allowed prescription to run before filing suit. The
court said the plaintiff's uncertainty as to the date imposed upon the
attorney a duty to investigate and ascertain the correct date. 7 An
early Louisiana malpractice case held an attorney liable for damages
resulting from the preparation of an incorrect tableau of the effects
of a succession because he failed to use all available records. 8
Another case denied the plaintiff a jury trial because his attorney
failed to timely post a jury cost bond. 5
Members of the legal profession may infer from Devore that
their own errors may be considered by the court in determining the
rights of their clients, at least in cases in which the complaint arises
after the plaintiff has retained counsel. Unfortunately, the implications in the opinion provide little clarification.
The issue of negligent misrepresentation by a public body was
considered by a Louisiana court for the first time in- Devore; the
court indicated that it would use the Restatement test, despite the
difficulty in applying that test to a public agency and despite the inconsistency with the analysis of duty under the Civil Code. The
court declined to scrutinize the inconsistencies and chose to treat
the school board as a private litigant. The majority also failed to
discuss the duty of an attorney to investigate his client's case,
although that appears to be a central factor in the deliberations.
Thus, public agencies are not provided with a certain standard of
care to which they will be held, and neither are attorneys apprised
of the extent to which they may rely on information provided by
others.
Martha M. Quinn
56. Watkins v. Sheppard, 278 So. 2d 890 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
57. Id. at 892.
58. Thompson v. Lobdell, 7 Rob. 369 (La. 1844).
59. Langston's Furniture & Appliance, Inc. v. Frigidaire Sales Corp., 313 So. 2d
273 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 318 So. 2d 42 (La. 1975). But see Smith v. Rosson,
233 Ala. 219, 171 So. 375 (1936); Kizer v. Martin, 132 So. 2d 14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1961) (in both cases the court excused the attorney's failures to discover certain
necessary information).

